Antwaun Bush v. City of Pittsburgh by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
6-11-2020 
Antwaun Bush v. City of Pittsburgh 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Antwaun Bush v. City of Pittsburgh" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 593. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/593 
This June is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 19-1009 
________________ 
 
ANTWAUN BUSH, 
 
           Appellant 
 
v. 
 
CITY OF PITTSBURGH; CITY OF PITTSBURGH BUREAU OF POLICE; 
NATHAN HARPER, individually and in his official capacity; 
OFFICER DONALD SNIDER; OFFICER DANIEL JOSEPH PAGA, JR.; 
OFFICER CHARLES THOMAS; OFFICER MORGAN JENKINS; 
OFFICER CHARLES HENDERSON; OFFICER DAVID CANNON                                         
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 2-16-cv-00926) 
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon 
________________ 
 
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
On September 24, 2019 
 
Before: MCKEE, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: June 11, 2020) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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ROTH, Circuit Judge 
 
On January 30, 2014, Antwaun Bush initiated an action in Allegheny County 
Court of Common Pleas by filing a praecipe for a Writ of Summons for injuries incurred 
during his arrest nearly two years earlier.  He named the City of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh’s 
former chief of police, and several police officers as defendants.  He did not file a 
complaint or a statement of intention to proceed.  Roughly two and a half years later and 
approximately four and a half years after the events that gave rise to his causes of action, 
Bush initiated a separate action in United States District Court for the Western District of 
Pennsylvania regarding the same events and against the same defendants, alleging both 
state tort claims and federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court granted 
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the ground that Bush’s claims were 
time-barred.  Bush has appealed.  We will affirm the District Court’s grant of summary 
judgment.  
I. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  In reviewing the 
District Court’s decision granting summary judgment, we exercise plenary review.1 
II. 
 In determining the statute of limitations for § 1983 claims, we apply “the personal 
injury tort law of the state where the cause of action arose.” 2  In Pennsylvania, where 
 
1 Lupyan v. Corinthian Colls., Inc., 761 F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2014).  
2 Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009).  
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Bush’s § 1983 claims arose, the statute of limitations for personal injury claims is two 
years.3  Bush’s causes of action accrued on February 15, 2012, the date of his arrest.  He 
filed his complaint in District Court on June 22, 2016, approximately two and a half years 
after the statute of limitation for his claims had expired.  Bush argues, however, that the 
statute of limitations for his claims brought in federal court was tolled as of January 30, 
2014, when he filed a praecipe for a Writ of Summons in the Allegheny County Court of 
Common Pleas.4   
Under Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1007, filing a praecipe constitutes the 
commencement of a civil action.  Once a plaintiff has filed a praecipe for a Writ of 
Summons, Pennsylvania law permits a defendant to request the prothonotary to order the 
plaintiff to file her complaint.5  Forgoing this opportunity forecloses the defendant’s 
ability to bring a statute of limitations defense.  The rationale for this is simple:  By not 
taking advantage of the opportunity to compel the plaintiff to timely bring a complaint, 
the defendant signals that he is unconcerned about the timeliness of that complaint.6  
Thus, if a defendant has been timely served a praecipe for a Writ of Summons in the state 
court in which the plaintiff ultimately brings his complaint, the statute of limitations is 
 
3 See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524. 
4 See Allegheny County Court of Common Pleas Docket No. GD 14-001416. 
5 See Pa. R. Civ. P. 1037(a) (“[T]he prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall 
enter a rule upon the plaintiff to file a complaint. If a complaint is not filed within twenty 
days after service of the rule, the prothonotary, upon praecipe of the defendant, shall 
enter a judgment of non pros.”). 
6 See Galbraith v. Gahagen, 204 A.2d 251, 252 (Pa. 1964) (“[W]here the plaintiff has had 
the summons served upon the defendant, and the defendant . . . is thus made aware of the 
lawsuit pending against him, he cannot complain if the plaintiff takes his time and files 
the complaint more than two years after service.”). 
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tolled, and the plaintiff can file her complaint past the statutory period.  Petitioner wants 
to extend this rule to cases like the one at issue here, where the plaintiff, after filing and 
serving a praecipe for a Writ of Summons in state court, files suit in federal court past the 
relevant statute of limitations period.  We decline to do so.  
Pennsylvania and federal law distinguish between actions commenced in state 
court and federal court for the purpose of tolling.7  The tolling of a claim by virtue of its 
initiation in state court does not transfer to claims subsequently brought in federal court.8  
Thus, initiating a suit in state court by filing a praecipe for Writ of Summons does not toll 
a separate action in federal court irrespective of the similarity of the claims.9  Had Bush 
filed his complaint in state court, it would not be time-barred—but he did not do so.   
III. 
We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
 
7 See, e.g., Falsetti v. United Mine Workers of Am., 355 F.2d 658, 662 (3d Cir. 1966) 
(rejecting contention that commencement of prior state court action served to toll the 
limitations period for subsequently filed federal action); Ammlung v. City of Chester, 494 
F.2d 811, 816 (3d Cir. 1974) (“The running of a Pennsylvania statute of limitations 
against a federal cause of action is not tolled under Pennsylvania concepts of tolling by 
the commencement of a similar suit in state court.”); Royal–Globe Ins. Cos. v. Hauck 
Mfg. Co., 335 A.2d 460, 462 (Pa. 1975) (“An action in state court does not toll the 
running of the statute of limitations against subsequent action in federal court.”). 
8 Ammlung, 494 F.2d at 816. 
9 Id. 
